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ohn Goering does an excellent job summarizing the early
 results of the Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing 
Demonstration (MTO). His paper serves as an excellent 
reference for anyone interested in learning about the 
motivation, design, and preliminary outcomes of MTO. The 
findings summarized by Goering also settle and raise a number 
of important policy-related questions. In this commentary, 
I place the MTO experiment in the context of housing policy as 
well as summarize some of the lessons learned and the 
remaining questions relevant to affordable housing policy.
The MTO experiment is significant not only because of the 
lessons it offers on how neighborhoods affect individuals but 
also because it represents a major effort to use social science to 
inform housing policy. Compared with many other policy 
domains, such as health or welfare, housing has been somewhat 
of a laggard in using social science to inform policy. Politics, 
ideology, and the latest fads have often carried the day instead. 
This is not to say that politics can or should be removed from 
policymaking. Rather, social science can inform such decisions, 
but in order to do that, rigorous social science evidence of the 
type provided by the MTO experiment is required. Without 
such evidence, we are left with only ideology to guide us. Thus, 
MTO may represent the advent of social science playing an 
important role in the crafting of housing policy. This would 
certainly be welcome.
The MTO experiment is also significant, of course, for its 
lessons on neighborhood effects. The quasi-experimental 
evidence thus far is consistent in showing that neighborhoods 
do in fact affect a number of behavioral outcomes. MTO’s 
results represent the strongest findings to date that 
neighborhoods do indeed matter. Living in a high-poverty 
neighborhood seems to inhibit upward mobility. The question 
of whether neighborhoods matter is certainly closer to 
becoming questions of how, and now what do we do, as a result 
of the evidence produced by MTO.
The mechanisms through which neighborhoods exert their 
effects still remain something of a black box, although there 
are a number of plausible theories. The evidence from the 
qualitative analyses of the MTO demonstration suggests that 
the positive examples set by residents of low-poverty 
neighborhoods and the better schools available in these 
neighborhoods may be the primary mechanisms through 
which program participants in low-poverty neighborhoods 
achieve improved outcomes (Popkin, Harris, and 
Cunningham 2002). More in-depth qualitative research is 
necessary before we can draw any definitive conclusions on the 
“how” of neighborhood effects.
MTO’s findings also force us more than ever to confront the 
implications of neighborhood effects and housing policy. 
Affordable housing policy in the United States has been 
predicated on the notion that it improves the physical 
characteristics of recipients’ housing, increases affordability, 
and, implicitly at least, enhances the neighborhood 
environment. To date, however, our policy has failed on the 
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last account. Indeed, the evidence suggests that in some 
respects, housing assistance has worsened neighborhood 
conditions, at least in terms of living in concentrated-poverty 
neighborhoods (Newman and Schnare 1997). The early results 
of the MTO demonstration show that neighborhood 
environment is indeed important. As others have suggested, 
neighborhoods help shape the opportunity structure 
confronting individuals (Galster and Killen 1995). These 
results suggest that when we craft affordable housing policy, we 
should take neighborhood quality into account. 
Before acting on this, however, we need to consider the 
following questions:
• When designing housing policy, are the magnitudes of 
the observed effects large enough to warrant taking into 
consideration neighborhood effects?
• Assuming the impacts are substantial and long-lasting, 
how might the findings of MTO inform affordable 
housing policy?
• Should integration of all the poor—either through 
dispersal or mixed-income revitalization—be a goal?
• Should neighborhood quality, like physical housing 
conditions, be a standard for housing assistance 
eligibility?
• Might we expect neighborhood effects to work in 
reverse? That is, will mixed-income housing in 
neighborhoods undergoing revitalization produce 
similar benefits for the poor? HOPE VI is predicated on 
the assumption that this is indeed the case. But 
neighborhood effects may operate differently for poor 
households who do not seek out more affluent 
neighbors. This is certainly an area worthy of further 
study.
The MTO demonstration cannot, of course, provide the 
answers to these questions. But it increasingly moves policy 
debates in the direction of addressing these issues. To continue 
to ignore them in the face of convincing evidence of the 
importance of neighborhood effects would not only be 
intellectually dishonest but morally bankrupt as well.References
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